file with the Public Utilities Commission: (1) Rule 14 of L.A. Cellular's General Rules Applicable to Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service; (2) L.A. Cellular's Advice Letter No. 15, which became effective on December 6, 1988; (3) and L.A. Cellular's Advice Letter No. 555, which became effective on January 24, 1995. Copies of the aforementioned materials are attached to the Declaration of Robert Wright filed concurrently herewith.

This Motion is based on this Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts submitted concurrently herewith, the Declaration of Stephen Fowler submitted concurrently herewith, the Declaration of Robert H. Wright submitted concurrently herewith, the Statement of Non-California and Regulatory Authority submitted concurrently herewith, the complete pleadings and records on file in this action, and such other evidence and argument as may be presented to the Court at or prior to the hearing of the Motion.

DATED: June 25, 1997

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP JAMES R. MARTIN DANIEL S. FLOYD ROBERT H. WRIGHT SEAN P. GATES

By: Varue Them Daniel S. Floyd

Attorneys for Defendant Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company

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#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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#### SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiff challenges the practices of defendant Los Angeles Celluler Telephone Company ("L.A. Cellular") in handling so-called "dropped calls" -- call: which are interrupted involuntarily. Plaintiff alleges that L.A. Cellular fraudulently conceals its dropped-call policy.

In making these allegations, plaintiff ignores the fact that L.A. Cellular has duly filed with the Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") tariffs that fully disclose its treatment of dropped calls and limit its liability for dropped calls. These tariffs have the force and effect of law and are deemed a part of all L.A. Cellular customer contracts. The tariffs render plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claims untenable.

Plaintiff is also precluded from challenging in this Court the terms of L.A. Cellular's tariffs on the grounds that they are allegedly unfair or misleading. Only the California Supreme Court or Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to review orders and decisions of the PUC, and courts have routinely rejected challenges to filed tariffs when brought in the superior court.

#### II.

#### **BACKGROUND**

The phrase "dropped call" refers to a cellular telephone call that is involuntarily interrupted due to causes beyond the control of a cellular telephone subscriber. Dropped calls may occur for a number of reasons including unusual atmospheric conditions and difficulty in providing cellular telephone service within certain hard to reach areas such as tunnels. Dropped calls are an expected and natural result of the use of radio-based technology in telecommunications. The phrase "dropped call" does not include those calls interrupted by causes within the control of a cellular subscriber, such as a subscriber accidentally unplugging a phone or allowing a battery to run down. (Declaration of Stephen Fowler ("Fowler Decl.") at ¶ 2.)

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#### A. The PUC Has Extensive Jurisdiction Over Public Utilities in California.

L.A. Cellular has filed with the PUC a tariff fully disclosing its treatment of dropped call credits. This tariff is deemed part of L.A. Cellular's customer contracts because of the PUC's authority over public utilities. First, the California Constitution subjects public utilities to "control by the Legislature." Cal. Const. Art. XII, § 3. To effect this control, the Constitution created the PUC and grants it far-reaching powers. Cal. Const. Art. XII, §§ 1-6. Second, the Legislature has detailed the scope of these powers in a complex regulatory scheme giving the PUC broad authority to investigate the practices, facilities, and services of public utilities. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 584, 703. The Legislature has further delegated to the PUC the power to bind public utilities by its orders, decisions, and directives. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 702.

The linchpin of the PUC's supervisory and regulatory power is its tariff filing requirements. The PUC has required public utilities to file tariffs, for PUC and public review, that detail their "rules, contracts, privileges, and facilities" relating to service. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 489. The PUC may alter these tariffs and establish new rules or practices for the utilities. Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 729, 761. And under the established law in California, these tariffs have the force and effect of law. See Dyke Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 56 Cal. 2d 105, 123 (1961) (stating that a tariff "when so published and filed, had the force and effect of a statute").

Because L.A. Cellular is a public utility providing cellular service in the Los Angeles area, L.A. Cellular was subject to the full regulatory authority of the PUC until 1995. See Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 216(a), 234. In 1993, the United States Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (amending the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.), which changed the regulatory scheme by expressly removing any state regulation of cellular service rates. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A). This law became effective in California on August 8, 1995 after the State of California unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Communications Commission for the authority to retain rate regulatory authority in

California. <u>Petition of California to Retain Regulatory Authority Over Intrastate Service</u>

<u>Rates</u>, 1995 WL 468206 (F.C.C. Aug. 8, 1995) (Order on Reconsideration).

Although the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 removed state jurisdiction over cellular service rates, the Act expressly provides that states may continue to regulate the "other terms and conditions" of cellular service. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3). The PUC has held that, until it promulgates uniform consumer protection rules, it will continue to regulate "other terms and conditions" by enforcing existing non-rate tariff provisions. Re Mobile Telephone Service and Wireless Communications, 174 P.U.R. 4th 543, 553 (Cal. PUC, Dec. 20, 1996); PUC General Order No 96-A (Cal. PUC, Mar. 1, 1962). L.A. Cellular's non-rate tariffs therefore continue to have the full force and effect of law and are binding on plaintiff in this case.

This Court has recognized the existence of federal preemption in this area in its Order denying L.A. Cellular's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In that Order, the Court ruled: "If this action seeks to regulate rates, then the action is preempted by the Federal Communications Act." (Order Dated 1/14/97.) As the court held in In re Comcast Cellular Telecom. Litigation, 949 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1996), claims based on failure to disclose a billing practice may be preempted. Id. at 1201. Here, however, this Court reasoned that (putting aside the issue of rates charged for dropped calls), the gravamen of the complaint was L.A. Cellular's alleged deceptive acts in "misleading its customers." (Order Dated 1/14/97.)

Although this Court found that plaintiff's complaint states claims outside the scope of federal preemption, plaintiff's efforts to avoid the bar of federal preemption have lead to a complaint that simply has no basis under state law. Plaintiff's claim that L.A. Cellular

In December of 1996 the PUC ruled that a cellular-service provider no longer need file new tariffs but must continue "to maintain a record of its rates, other terms and conditions and revisions thereto, at its general office." Re Mobile Telephone Service and Wireless Communications, 174 P.U.R. 4th 543, 552 (Cal. PUC, Dec. 20, 1996). L.A. Cellular's tariff addressing dropped-calls, however, dates prior to December 1996 and is on file with the PUC. (Declaration of Robert Wright ("Wright Decl.") at ¶¶ 4-5 and Exhs. B, C.)

conceals its policy is without merit because L.A. Cellular's tariff fully discloses its policy; the tariff has the force and effect of law, and it constitutes notice to all customers.

# B. <u>L.A. Cellular's Tariff Discloses Its Policy for Dropped Calls and Limits its</u> <u>Liability.</u>

As required by law, L.A. Cellular has filed with the PUC its Retail Tariffs and Special Conditions Applicable to the Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service and its General Rules Applicable to Cellular Radio Telecommunications Service ("L.A. Cellular's tariffs"). (Wright Decl. at ¶ 2.) (Undisputed Facts 1, 19, 27.) These tariffs include provisions limiting L.A. Cellular's liability.

Rule 14 of L.A. Cellular's tariffs discloses L.A. Cellular's liability to its customers for interruptions in service. (Wright Decl. at ¶ 3 and Exh. A.) The Rule is entitled "Limitation of Liability" and begins: "The Company's liability to its customers for interruptions in the service furnished by the Company is as follows: . . . ." (Undisputed Facts 2, 20, 28.) The Rule then details the limits of L.A. Cellular's liability including its liability for dropped calls.

Part 6 of the Rule states that "[i]n the case of dropped or garbled calls, and on receipt of appropriate proof, the Utility will extend credit to the customer for part or all of the usage charges applicable to the calls in question." (Undisputed Facts 3, 21, 29.) L.A. Cellular added this provision to its tariff by Advice Letter No. 15, which became effective on December 6, 1988. (Wright Decl. at ¶ 4 and Exh. B.) (Undisputed Facts 4, 22, 30.)

Part 8 of the Rule states that "[c]laims for credits by non-reseller customers on account of service interruptions or for missed, dropped or garbled calls shall be made within ninety days after the end of the relevant customer's billing cycle in which the interruption or other malfunction is alleged to have occurred." (Undisputed Facts 5, 23, 31.) L.A. Cellular added this provision to its tariff by Advice Letter No. 555, which became effective on January 24, 1995. (Wright Decl. at ¶ 5 and Exh. C.) (Undisputed Facts 6, 24, 32.)

L.A. Cellular fully complies with Rule 14 of its tariff by providing a credit to any of its customers who request credit for dropped calls. L.A. Cellular provides such a credit upon the request of a customer when a customer redials a call within five minutes after that call is

dropped and the customer has not placed any intermediate calls prior to redailing the dropped call. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 3.) (Undisputed Facts 7, 33.) The amount of the credit is the air time cost to the customer of the first minute of the redialed call. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 3.) (Undisputed Facts 8, 34.)

Because L.A. Cellular's customer service representatives do not have access to a customer's calling records for any given month until after the end of the billing cycle for that month, L.A. Cellular requires that a customer who is requesting credit for dropped calls do so after the end of that customer's billing cycle. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 4.) (Undisputed Facts 9, 35.) The customer has ninety days from the end of the billing cycle in which the interruption occurred to request credit for dropped calls. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 4.) (Undisputed Facts 10, 36.) This policy is fully disclosed in the tariff filed with the PUC. (Wright Decl. at ¶ 2-5, Exh. A, B, C.) (Undisputed Facts 1-6.)

To ensure compliance with the tariff, L.A. Cellular trains its customer service representatives regarding the proper handling of dropped-call credits and requires all of its representatives to familiarize themselves with L.A. Cellular's policy for handling credits for dropped-calls. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 6.) (Undisputed Facts 11, 37, 38.) Thus L.A. Cellular's Core Service Skills training manual instructs representatives regarding "When a Customer Calls for Dropped Call (Billed Air) Credit." Among other things, the representative is asked to "Please Remember" that "One air time minute credit will be issued for each redial made after a call has been 'dropped,' 'cut-off' or disconnected mid-conversation." (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 6 and Exh. A.)

L.A. Cellular's customer service is available by telephone twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 5.) (Undisputed Facts 12, 39.) L.A. Cellular staffs its customer care department in anticipation of expected call volumes and at the present time employs approximately two hundred and fifty customer service representatives. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 5.) (Undisputed Facts 13, 40.) L.A. Cellular's customer service representatives address the questions and concerns of L.A. Cellular's customers and, when appropriate, provide customers with credits including credits for dropped-calls. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 5.)

L.A. Cellular has made no attempt to misrepresent the terms of its policy for providing dropped-call credits and none of its written materials misrepresent the terms of that policy. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 7.) (Undisputed Facts 14, 26.) To the contrary, L.A. Cellular has trained its customer service representatives to inform customers of L.A. Cellular's policy for handling dropped-call credits whenever a customer requests such information. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 7.) (Undisputed Facts 15, 41.) The fact that L.A. Cellular routinely receives requests for dropped-call credits and routinely extends such credits demonstrates the absurdity of plaintiff's argument that L.A. Cellular has concealed its policy of providing credits for dropped calls. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 7.) (Undisputed Facts 16, 25, 42.) Finally, L.A. Cellular's cellular-service contracts refer generally to the existence of L.A. Cellular's tariffs on file with the PUC (and those tariffs disclose L.A. Cellular's policy for handling dropped-call credits). (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 7.) (Undisputed Facts 17, 18.)

III.

#### LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THIS MOTION

Summary judgment is proper where "there is no triable issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(c). Summary adjudication is proper where "a cause of action has no merit" and granting the motion "completely disposes of a cause of action." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437(f). A party cannot prevent the entry of summary adjudication by inartful pleading; where "separate and distinct wrongful acts are combined under the same cause of action," summary adjudication is proper to dispose of a cause of action based on one or more of those acts. Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Ct., 12 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1854 (1993).

In this case, L.A. Cellular has produced evidence proving a complete defense. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to show "that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(o)(2). Plaintiff cannot meet this burden and so L.A. Cellular is entitled to summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

# PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION FAIL BECAUSE L.A. CELLULAR'S TREATMENT OF DROPPED CALLS IS DICTATED BY TARIFF

A. Plaintiff Cannot Claim Ignorance of L.A. Cellular's Provisions Regarding

Dropped Calls.

for Dropped Calls.

1. L.A. Cellular's Customers Routinely Request and Receive Credits

In alleging that L.A. Cellular conceals its policy of giving credits for dropped calls, plaintiff runs headlong into the facts. In fact L.A. Cellular's customers routinely request credit for dropped-calls and L.A. Cellular routinely grants such requests. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 7.) These frequent requests dispel any notion that L.A. Cellular has engaged in the fraudulent practices suggested by plaintiff.

2. L.A. Cellular's Tariff, Governing its Liability for Dropped Calls, is

Part of its Customers' Contracts. In dair objected the charges file for the Charges for the Charges

Plaintiff not only ignores the fact that L.A. Cellular routinely gives dropped-call credits, but also the fact that L.A. Cellular has disclosed its dropped-call policy in a tariff on file with the PUC. By her complaint, plaintiff asserts the existence of a scheme by which L.A. Cellular fraudulently conceals from its customers the existence of its dropped-call policy. The fact that L.A. Cellular's tariff discloses its dropped-calls policy disproves plaintiff's claim.

By law, L.A. Cellular's tariff forms a part of its contracts with its customers.

"Pertinent rules and regulations which the Public Utilities Commission requires a public utility to adopt and file with the commission automatically become an implied term of any contract made between that public utility and its customer." Sherwood v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 2d 354, 359 (1962). As explained in Gardner v. Basich Brothers

Construction Co., 44 Cal. 2d 191 (1955), tariffs on file with the PUC "are deemed a part of" every contract between a public utility and its customers "and the parties are deemed to have

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 contracted with such provisions in mind." <u>Id.</u> at 194. Under this rule, L.A. Cellular's tariff disclosing and limiting its liability for dropped calls is a term of its contract with plaintiff and bars plaintiff's claims in this action.

Tariffs Limiting a Utility's Liability.

Plaintiff had notice of L.A. Cellular's dropped-call provisions for the very reason that they are contained in L.A. Cellular's tariff. Since public utilities are subject to a complex regulatory scheme, and since the PUC has held that it will continue to enforce the existing non-rate tariff provisions of cellular service providers, L.A. Cellular's customers are deemed to have notice of tariffs on file with the PUC.

The California Supreme Court has held that a lack of actual knowledge of a tariff is without legal consequence. In <u>Hischemoeller v. National Ice & Cold Storage</u>, 46 Cal. 2d 318 (1956), a plaintiff brought suit in superior court against a public warehouseman for damages allegedly resulting from negligence in the storage of dried chili peppers. <u>Id.</u> at 320. Because the defendant was a public utility, the California Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that "actual knowledge and understanding on plaintiff's part of the clauses limiting liability were essential to any such limitations." <u>Id.</u> at 324-35. The Supreme Court explained that actual knowledge was not necessary because the tariff provisions were part of the plaintiff's contract:

Defendant claims the schedules with their rates and regulations and limitations of liability issued by the Public Utilities Commission automatically became implied terms of any contract made between a public utility and its customer. Also that absence of actual knowledge of these terms on the part of the customer is legally inconsequential. This contention is correct.

<u>Id.</u> at 325. Under the rule of <u>Hischemoeller</u>, the question of whether plaintiff understood or reviewed L.A. Cellular's tariffs is immaterial and the tariffs are enforceable pursuant to their terms. <u>See also Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell</u>, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 1234 (1988) ("[T]he tariff limitation on liability has been held to apply to third parties as well as to the utility's customers.")

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#### L.A. Cellular Has No Duty to Provide Additional Notice of its 4. Dropped-Call Tariff.

In alleging that L.A. Cellular "conceals the fact that it will issue airtime credit for its customers' dropped calls upon request," plaintiff suggests that L.A. Cellular has a duty to supplement its tariff filings by providing additional notice of its dropped-call tariff. (Complaint at ¶ 13.) Yet the very rationale underlying the use of tariffs contradicts plaintiff's suggestion.

A right to notice beyond that provided by tariff would undermine the bright-line rule articulated in decisions such as Hischemoeller. Decisions limiting a plaintiff's recovery to that set forth in the tariff regardless of the plaintiff's state of knowledge would have little meaning if a plaintiff could obtain recovery in excess of the tariff simply by alleging lack of notice. As stated in Cole v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 419 (1952), tariff limitations of liability are an integral part of the regulatory scheme: "The theory underlying these decisions is that a public utility, being strictly regulated in all operations with considerable curtailment of its rights and privileges, shall likewise be regulated and limited as to its liabilities." See also Trammell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 538, 551 (1976) ("If uniformity is to prevail, the tariff schedule must represent the whole duty and the whole liability of the company rendering the service."). Plaintiff cannot premise a cause of action on a lack of notice of L.A. Cellular's tariff without upsetting the certainty and uniformity that the Legislature has attempted to ensure for public utilities by requiring the filing of tariffs.

#### Plaintiff Cannot Challenge the Terms of L.A. Cellular's Tariff in This B. Court.

Finally, should plaintiff's complaint be read as an attack on the terms of L.A. Cellular's tariff, plaintiff cannot make that attack here. As noted above, the PUC has announced its decision to continue enforcing the terms of existing non-rate tariffs of cellular service providers. As a consequence, Public Utilities Code Section 1759 will divest this Court of jurisdiction to review or reverse L.A. Cellular's dropped-calls tariff. The California

Supreme Court addressed an identical issue in Waters v. Pacific Telephone Company, 12 Cal. 3d 1, (1974), where a plaintiff sought damages for inadequate telephone service that purportedly included "lack of proper maintenance service, incompleted calls, unauthorized removal of phones, improper installation of phones, and a variety of other frustrating experiences specified in her complaint." Id. at 5. Because the telephone utility had filed tariffs limiting its liability for interruptions in service, the California Supreme Court affirmed the entry of judgment for defendant. Id. at 4; see also Cole, 112 Cal. App. 2d at 420; Trammell, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 554. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on Public Utilities Code Section 1759, which divests a superior court of "jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or decision of the commission." Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1759. Here, the PUC has announced its decision to continue enforcing non-rate tariffs. This Court thus lacks jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the terms of L.A. Cellular's dropped-call tariff.<sup>2</sup>

# C. Without Legislative or Administrative Guidance, This Court Cannot Determine the Appropriate Level for Cellular-Service-Provider Customer Service.

Plaintiff's claim of fraudulent practices also extends to a vague allegation that

L.A. Cellular's customer service is so inadequate as to constitute an unfair or fraudulent
business practice. Undeterred by the fact that L.A. Cellular's customers routinely request and
receive credit for dropped-calls, plaintiff nonetheless alleges a fraudulent scheme in which
customers calling L.A. Cellular "must pass through a series of electronic menus," wait an
excessive time for a live operator, and engage in an allegedly "time-consuming and
burdensome reporting procedure." (Complaint at ¶¶ 16, 17.) Because plaintiff seeks to
enjoin these practices, she necessarily asks this Court to oversee L.A. Cellular's customer
service operations including the number of customer service representatives it must employ
and the content of the electronic menus in its computerized telephone answering system. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> As discussed previously, plaintiff's action is subject to federal preemption to the extent that it affects rates.

Court ought not to engage in the type of micro-management requested by plaintiff and should leave such matters to resolution by the competitive forces of the marketplace or the appropriate administrative agency.

Courts have long recognized that private actions are not appropriate where an initial determination of the applicable standard is better left to another governmental entity. For example, in California Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 4th 205 (1994), the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had abused its discretion by issuing an injunction under Section 17200 prohibiting banks from charging a \$3 service fee for certain check deposits. The appellate court held that the question of whether the fee was too high was best left to the Legislature or to administrative regulation: "Judicial review of one service fee charged by one bank is an entirely inappropriate method of overseeing bank service fees." Id. at 218. The court recognized that it was ill-equipped to make the initial determination of what fee was proper: "Legislative committees and an administrative officer charged with regulating an industry have better sources of gathering information and assessing its value than do courts in isolated cases." Id. (quoting Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 311 (1971)). The court therefore dissolved the injunction.

Similarly, in Wolfe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 46 Cal. App. 4th 554 (1996), the court refused to entertain a Section 17200 action based on insurers' refusal to issue new homeowners' policies in the wake of the Northridge earthquake. In that case, as in this one, the defendants "ha[d] violated no laws." 46 Cal. App. 4th at 564. Moreover, "a judicial resolution of [the] complaint would involve the courts in microeconomic managing." Id. at 567. Rather than undertake such a perilous task, the court found it dispositive that: (1) the insurance industry was heavily regulated, (2) the Legislature had ordered the insurance commissioner to investigate the problem, and (3) no specific statute addressed the defendants' actions. Id. at 563-566.

The courts of this State have thus regularly and wisely refused to trump reasoned legislative and administrative decisionmaking through the instrument of Section 17200.<sup>3</sup>

Under the consistent holding of these decisions, the question of what customer service is adequate, as the question of what fee was too high in California Grocers, is a question for the marketplace, an administrative agency, or the Legislature. These bodies are better able to make such a determination. As the California Grocers court recognized, administrative agencies and legislative committees "have better sources of gathering information and assessing its value" than do the courts. These bodies are also in a superior position to create a uniform rule for all cellular telephone companies and consider the impact of such a standard on other regulatory provisions.<sup>4</sup>

Absent action by an administrative agency or the Legislature, this Court should permit

Absent action by an administrative agency or the Legislature, this Court should permit market forces to determine the level of customer service that L.A. Cellular is to provide. The relief that plaintiff seeks would enmesh this Court in the daily business operations of L.A. Cellular and would require this Court to second guess such decisions as whether L.A. Cellular should be required to hire more than the approximately 250 customer service representatives it currently employs. (Fowler Decl. at ¶ 5.) Moreover, the relief that plaintiff seeks in this

See also Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 1301-02 (1993) (refusing to interfere with health care contracts pursuant to Section 17200 because "the courts cannot assume general regulatory powers over health maintenance organizations through the guise of enforcing Business and Professions Code section 17200"); cf. Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1168 (1991) (refusing, in an action brought under the Unruh Act, to prohibit landlords from using income formulas because "[i]n the absence of clear legislative direction, . . . we are unwilling to engage in complex economic regulation under the guise of judicial decisionmaking").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The PUC is currently examining the contours of its jurisdiction over "other terms and conditions" of cellular service. It is contemplating the development of uniform rules that will address "consumer complaints, billing disputes, and related [cellular-service-provider] matters." Re Mobile Telephone Service and Wireless Communications, 174 P.U.R. 4th 543, 553 (Cal. PUC, Dec. 20, 1996).

forum would be wholly inappropriate, as it would lead to the oversight of the customer service of only one company - L.A. Cellular - and not that of its competitors.

V.

#### CONCLUSION

This Court should grant L.A. Cellular's motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication as L.A. Cellular has fully disclosed its treatment of dropped calls in a tariff filed with the PUC. Because the PUC has announced that it will continue to enforce the existing non-rate tariffs of cellular service providers, L.A. Cellular's dropped-call tariff has the force and effect of law and is deemed a part of L.A. Cellular's customer contracts.

DATED: June 25, 1997

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By: Daniel S. Floyd

Attorneys for Defendant Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company

LL970790.173/49

EXHIBIT 7

1 2 3 4 5 6	GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP JAMES R. MARTIN, SBN 045602 DANIEL S. FLOYD, SBN 123819 ROBERT H. WRIGHT, SBN 155489 SEAN P. GATES, SBN 186247 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, California 90071-3197 (213) 229-7000 Attorneys for Defendant Los Angeles Cellular				
7	Telephone Company				
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA				
9	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES				
10		1			
11	ERIKA LANDIN, on behalf of herself and	CASE NO. BC 143305			
12	all others similarly situated,	Assigned to the Honorable Ernest M. Hiroshige			
13	Plaintiff,	DECLARATION OF STEPHEN FOWLER			
14	<b>v.</b>	IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION OF LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE			
15	LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY,	COMPANY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY			
16	Defendant.	ADJUDICATION			
17 18	•	[Notice of Motion and Motion, Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Declaration of Robert Wright, and Statement of Non-California and Regulatory Authority filed herewith]			
19					
20		Date: July 30, 1997 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept: 54			
21		Trial Date: None Set			
22		CLASS ACTION			
23	I, Stephen Fowler, declare as follows:				
24					
25	Company ("L.A. Cellular"). This declaration is submitted in support of L.A. Cellular's				
26	1				
27	personal knowledge of the facts set forth below and, if called upon to do so, I could and				
28	would competently testify thereto under oath.				

son, Dunn & Crutcher LLP

- 2. The phrase "dropped call" refers to a cellular telephone call that is involuntarily interrupted due to causes beyond the control of a cellular telephone subscriber. Dropped calls may occur for a number of reasons including system congestion, unusual atmospheric conditions, and difficulty in providing cellular telephone service within certain hard to reach areas such as tunnels. Dropped calls are an expected and natural result of the use of radio-based technology in telecommunications. The phrase "dropped call" does not include those calls interrupted by causes within the control of a cellular subscriber, such as a subscriber accidentally unplugging a phone or allowing a battery to run down.
- 3. As the Vice President, Customer Care, of L.A. Cellular, I am responsible for ensuring that L.A. Cellular provides a credit to any of its customers who request credit for a dropped call. L.A. Cellular provides such a credit upon the request of a customer when a customer redials a call within five minutes after that call is dropped and the customer has not placed any intermediate calls prior to returning the dropped call. The amount of the credit is the air time cost to the customer of the first minute of the redialed call.
- 4. Because L.A. Cellular's customer service representatives do not have access to a customer's calling records for any given month until after the end of the billing cycle for that month, L.A. Cellular requires that a customer who is requesting credit for dropped calls do so after the end of that customer's billing cycle. The customer then has ninety days to request credit for dropped calls measured from the end of the billing cycle in which the interruption occurred.
- 5. L.A. Cellular's customer service is available by telephone twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. L.A. Cellular staffs its customer care department in anticipation of expected call volumes and at the present time employs approximately two hundred and fifty customer service representatives. L.A. Cellular's customer service representatives address the questions and concerns of L.A. Cellular's customers and, when appropriate, provide customers with credits including credits for dropped-calls.
- 6. L.A. Cellular trains each of its customer service representatives regarding the proper handling of dropped-call credits and requires all of its representatives to familiarize for the proper handling of dropped-call credits and requires all of its representatives to familiarize for the proper handling of dropped-call credits and requires all of its representatives to familiarize for the proper handling of dropped-call credits and requires all of its representatives to familiarize for the proper handling of dropped-call credits and requires all of its representatives.

themselves with L.A. Cellular's policy for handling credits for dropped-calls. Thus L.A. Cellular's Core Service Skills training manual instructs representatives regarding "When a Customer Calls for Dropped Call (Billed Air) Credit." Among other things, the representative is asked to "Please Remember" that "One air time minute credit will be issued for each redial made after a call has been 'dropped,' 'cut-off' or disconnected mid-conversation." Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of section 11, page 36 of L.A. Cellular's Core Service Skills training manual containing instructions on the handling of dropped calls.

- 7. L.A. Cellular's customer service representatives routinely receive requests for no dropped-call credits and routinely extend such credits pursuant to L.A. Cellular's policy.
- 8. I am not aware of any act or attempt by L.A. Cellular to misrepresent the terms of its policy for providing dropped-call credits nor any written materials from L.A. Cellular misrepresenting the terms of that policy. To the contrary, L.A. Cellular has trained its customer service representatives to inform customers of L.A. Cellular's policy for handling dropped-call credits whenever a customer requests such information. I am also aware that L.A. Cellular's cellular-service contracts refer generally to the existence of L.A. Cellular's tariffs on file with the Public Utilities Commission.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Declaration was executed on May 2, 1997, at Cerritos, California.

Stephen Fowler

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#### When a Customer Calls for Dropped Call (Billed Air) Credit

- 1. Write down account or mobile number on log sheet.
- 2. Verify all info on the 0301 or 0101 screen.
- 3. Go to the 0308 screen.
- 4. Go to the summary of call charges. Check to see if the customer exceeded the minutes included in their Value Plan Agreement. If so, go to the detail of calls.
- 5. Credit the account 1 minute for any number dialed again in succession within 5 minutes.
- 6. Get the credit sheet and add credit to sheet with Billed Air code (4500).
- 7. Go to comments, note how much credit was processed, which code was used, what mobile number was credited and for which month.

#### Please Remember:

- 1. One air time minute credit will be issued for each redial made after a call has been "dropped," "cut-off" or disconnected mid-conversation. Note: Calls must be redialed within 5 minutes.
- 2. Redials are not credited, the dropped call is credited.
- 3. Incoming wrong number Maximum of 1 minute credit.
- 4. Outgoing wrong number 1 minute maximum air time, 1 minute toll.
- 5. Service and radio station calls are charged at the regular service rates.

EXHIBIT 8

GIBSON. DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 1 STEVEN E. SLETTEN. SBN 107571 2 RICHARD D. GLUCK, SBN 151675 CHRISTINE NAYLOR, SBN 172277 3 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, California 90071-3197 4 (213) 229-7000 5 Attorneys for Defendant Los Angeles Cellular 6 Telephone Company 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 9 10 ERIKA LANDIN, on behalf of herself and CASE NO. BC 143305 11 all others similarly situated, Assigned to the Honorable Ernest M. Hiroshige 12 Plaintiff. PROOF OF SERVICE OF: 13 V. NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF 14 DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES CELLULAR LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE TELEPHONE COMPANY TO CONTINUE COMPANY, TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED 15 PRETRIAL DATES: MEMORANDUM OF Defendant. 16 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATIONS OF STEVEN E. SLETTEN AND GREGORY P. FARRELL IN SUPPORT THEREOF; [PROPOSED] ORDER 17 18 February 16, 1999 Date: 19 9:00 a.m. Time: Dept: 54 20 21 March 17, 1999 Trial Date: 22 23 24 25 LT990280.048/1+ 26 27 28

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED PRETRIAL DATES; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; DECLARATIONS

OF STEVEN E. SLETTEN AND GREGORY P. FARRELL IN SUPPORT THEREOF; [PROPOSED] ORDER

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GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP STEVEN E. SLETTEN, SBN 107571 RICHARD D. GLUCK, SBN 151675 CHRISTINE NAYLOR, SBN 172277 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, California 90071-3197

(213) 229-7000

Attorneys for Defendant Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company

# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

ERIKA LANDIN. on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff.

 $\mathbf{V}$ .

LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY.

Defendant.

CASE NO. BC 143305

Assigned to the Honorable Ernest M. Hiroshige

DECLARATION OF STEVEN E. SLETTEN
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LOS
ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE
COMPANY'S MOTION TO CONTINUE
TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED
PRETRIAL DATES

Date:

February 16, 1999

Time:

9:00 a.m.

Dept:

54

Trial Date:

March 17, 1999

FILED UNDER SEAL

I, Steven E. Sletten, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before all courts of the State of California, and am a partner with the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. I am one of the lawyers principally responsible for representing defendant Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company ("L.A. Cellular") in this action. The matters stated in this declaration are

true of my own personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to them.

- 2. Plaintiff filed this action on January 26, 1996 as a putative class action. Her complaint alleged the existence of a class of individuals comprised of all L.A. Cellular subscribers who experienced dropped calls for which they received partial or no credit. Plaintiff's complaint seeks to enjoin L.A. Cellular from "acts of unfair competition." as described in the complaint, and also purports to seek disgorgement and/or restitution on behalf of the class.
- 3. L.A. Cellular's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on November 12. 1997 and the Court issued its Decision on December 19, 1997. Distinguishing the decision in Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1 (1974), in which the plaintiff sued defendant for monetary damages because of defendant's alleged failure to provide adequate phone service, the Court denied L.A. Cellular's motion for summary judgment because "plaintiff is not seeking damages . . . [but] is challenging whether or not the lack of advertising constitutes an unfair business practice under Bus. & Prof. Code §17200." A true copy of the Court's December 19, 1997 Ruling on Submitted Matter (denying L.A. Cellular's motion for summary judgment) is attached to this declaration as Exhibit A.
- 4. Plaintiff's motion for class certification was heard by the Court on July 31, 1998. On September 30, 1998, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification. A true copy of the Court's September 30, 1998 Ruling on Submitted Matter (denying plaintiff's motion for class certification) is attached to this declaration as Exhibit B. The Court reiterated in its ruling that "plaintiff does not seek damages, but rather challenges the failure to advertise the drop call credit policy." Exhibit B at pp. 2-3. Citing the Court of Appeals' decision in *Day v. AT&T Corp.*, 63 Cal. App. 4th, 325 (1998), this Court held that "to seek injunctive relief in this type of action was appropriate; to seek a monetary recovery, whether or not in the form of disgorgement, was not." Exhibit B at p. 3.

- 5. This Court conducted a Trial Setting Conference on November 13, 1998. At that Conference, this matter was set on the Court's trial calendar for March 17, 1999.
- 6. During the week of January 11, 1999, I spoke with Mary Jane Fait, one of the lawyers representing the plaintiff in this action. I informed Ms. Fait that recent changes in L.A. Cellular's structure has resulted in AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. assuming management and supervisory responsibility for L.A. Cellular's operations. I also told her that the change in L.A. Cellular's management structure would result in several changes in L.A. Cellular's policies and operations, many of which would take place over the next several months. One of the upcoming changes is a change in the way in which L.A. Cellular handles credits for dropped calls. I further informed Ms. Fait that we believe that the change, when implemented, will moot plaintiff's remaining claims in this action.
- 7. In light of these developments, I requested that plaintiff stipulate to continue the trial date and all pretrial dates in this action to allow the parties time to determine how the upcoming change in L.A. Cellular's dropped-call credit policy would affect this action. I told Ms. Fait that because the change will render moot plaintiff's remaining claims in this action, we believe it makes no sense to incur the substantial expense of preparing this case for trial. Ms. Fait told me that she would have to check with her co-counsel, and would get back to me shortly. She also requested that I put in writing our suggestion and the reasons for it.
- 8. On January 15, 1999, Ms. Fait called to tell me that she had discussed the matter with her co-counsel and that they were unwilling to stipulate to continue the trial date. She did agree, however, that it would be advantageous to all parties for the Court to consider sooner rather than later what impact the change in L.A. Cellular's dropped-call policy will have on this case.
- 9. On January 19, 1999, I sent Ms. Fait a letter describing the upcoming changes at L.A. Cellular and reiterating my request that plaintiff stipulate to continue the trial date in this matter. I also informed Ms. Fait in my letter that L.A. Cellular would be scheduling an *exparte* hearing to request an order allowing a motion to continue the trial date to be heard on

shortened time. A true copy of my letter to Ms. Fait is attached to this declaration as Exhibit C.

- I called Ms. Fait on January 25, 1999 to inform her that L.A. Cellular would 10. appear ex parte in Department 54 at 8:30 a.m. on January 27, 1999, to request an order shortening time to bring and have heard a motion to vacate the trial date and all associated pretrial dates. In subsequent conversations with Ms. Fait, she advised that her partner Michael Hyman, would participate telephonically at the ex parte hearing and that her cocounsel Lionel Glancy (or someone from his office) would appear in person. Today, January 26, 1999, I spoke with Peter Binkow, counsel for plaintiff and confirmed that the ex parte application would be heard on Thursday January 28 and not Wednesday January 27, and I confirmed this in a letter to Mr. Binkow with a copy to Mr. Hyman. A copy of my letter is attached to this Declaration as Exhibit D.
- 11. The upcoming change in L.A. Cellular's dropped-call credit policy constitutes a "significant change" in the status of the case. It is not a development that could reasonably have been anticipated at the time of the Trial Setting Conference in November. The decision to make the change was communicated to me only recently, and I am informed the change will be implemented in the next several months. As soon I we became aware of the planned change, I contacted counsel for plaintiff to discuss how the change in policy will impact plaintiff's claims in this case.
- 12. This case only recently has been placed on the Court's trial calendar, and no previous continuances have been requested by any of the parties or granted by the Court.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 26th day of January, 1999 at Los Angeles, California.

Steven E. Sletten

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#### **DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY HAND DELIVERY**

2 declares as follows: 3 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California; I 4 am over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not a party to this action; my business address is 640 So. Olive Street, Los Angeles, California 90014 in 5 said County and State; I am employed as a messenger by ENI; on the 29th 6 day of January, 1999, I served the attached: 7 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES 8 CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED PRETRIAL DATES; MEMORANDUM OF 9 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF; 10 DECLARATIONS OF STEVEN E. SLETTEN AND GREGORY P. **FARRELL IN SUPPORT THEREOF** 11 12 DECLARATION OF STEVEN E. SLETTEN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY'S 13 MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED 14 PRETRIAL DATES 15 DECLARATION OF GREGORY P. FARRELL IN SUPPORT OF 16 DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED 17 PRETRIAL DATES 18 [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT LOS ANGELES 19 CELLULAR TELEPHONE COMPANY'S MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL DATE AND ALL ASSOCIATED PRETRIAL DATES 20 21 PROOF OF SERVICE 22 by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to each of the 23 persons named below at the address shown: 24 Lionel Z. Glancy, Esq. Peter A. Binkow, Esq. 25 Law Offices of Lionel Z. Glancy 26 1801 Avenue of the Stars, Ste 308 27 Los Angeles, CA 90067

Attorneys for Erika Landin